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Prussian Militarism and the German Wars of Unification

Hamza Elshakankiri
University of Regina
(Regina, Canada)

Prussia was always seen as the embodiment of military prowess and power. It was, in
many ways, a state that was built by an army. Its sense of militarism spread dramatically to its
soldiers and civilians, affecting their societies, politics, and culture. This popular militarism was
first experienced by the German people in the Liberation War in 1813-14, as the Prussian and
German armies drove the French invaders out of German territory. Yet after this glorious victory,
Prussian militarism went into hibernation, as the Congress of Vienna put Europe back together.
Thus, the torch of nationalism was in the hands of liberals and romantics, who would prove
themselves too dreamy to achieve their goals. It was only under the leadership of Otto von
Bismarck (1815-1898) that Prussia defeated Austria, and Bismarck was able to unite the people
and the military in his Crusade for Germany. Bismarck’s total victory over France not only
opened the door for German Unification, but it ensured a long-lasting glory for Prussian
militarism, as it secured its reputation of superiority, even invincibility.
After Napoleon’s (1769-1821) successful campaigns in German territory in 1805 and
1806, the German states were in a predicament. Their armies were shattered, and their
sovereignty at risk. The once mighty Prussian military, with its leaders lacking the enthusiasm
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and genius of Frederick the Great (1712-1786), was now humiliated and defeated, and the
foreign invaders occupied Berlin. The real danger though, lurked in the effects that these defeats
had on the subjects: “The most loyal subjects once pertaining to the Emperor and Empire, the
Imperial towns, Imperial nobility, and Imperial churches were almost all mediatized - their
possessions were transferred to the middle and larger sized German states, who for their part
thought that their future lay in a close association with France.” 1 Subjects no longer believed in
their leaders’ genius since they were powerless to protect their states from total invasion. Even
the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, which would have shaken all of Europe in earlier
years, had barely any backlash as “the rest of the world merely shrugged its shoulders over the
demise of the almost thousand-year-old Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation on a point of
order.” 2 In addition, German states in the Confederation of the Rhine sent soldiers in their
thousands to fight in Napoleon’s Campaigns. Ironically, if successful, these campaigns would
only ensure the prolonged subjection of Germans to French rule. The German Nation needed
liberation, not only from invading armies but one that would also lead to a Germany that is more
German than French.
Many German intellectuals appealed to the people to restore their Germanness and fight
against the French invaders and their ideals. This new movement came to take on a new religious
fervor. Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860), a German poet, preached to his people: “Let the
unanimity of your hearts be your church, let hatred of the French be your religion, let Freedom
and Fatherland be your saints, to whom you pray!” 3 The new enthusiasm of German people took
Hagen Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck: 1763-1867,
trans. Sarah Hanbury. Tenison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 48.
1
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on the nature of a Crusade; the goal was Germany, and the antichrist was Napoleon. It is at this
critical point of German nationalism that militarism also has its place in the sun. Militarism was
no longer limited to encouraging soldiers but greatly grew with civilians as well, many of whom
would gladly enlist and fight for their Fatherland. Some of the German youth “undertook night
marches and military maneuvers and practiced fencing and crossbow-shooting so as to be ready
for the uprising against the forces of occupation.” 4 The fight was no longer restricted to soldiers;
it was a chance for the entire Nation to unite for liberation. The one who took the great
responsibility of leading the Crusade was Frederick William III of Prussia (1770-1840). Though
he was always seen as a weak character, his call to Germans and Prussians placed him at the
forefront of the German War of Liberation. “‘The king called and everyone, everyone came,’
was how the War of Liberation later came to be viewed from the perspective of Wilhelmine
Germany.” 5 Prussia, being a leading German state in the fight against Napoleon, was seen as the
savior of Germany, and Prussian soldiers were the liberators. Prussia’s role in defeating
Napoleon in 1814, and again at the battle of Waterloo, ensured that any shame that Prussia had
suffered was removed, and instead, gained glory for their victories over Napoleon. These
victories ensured that Prussia’s cooperation was vital in post-Napoleon Europe.
However, after such a glorious victory and the rising theories and plans about a united
German nation, the German states in many ways went back to their old ways. Prussia, which led
the forces of liberation, “stood on the sidelines of European power politics, steering in the lee of
the great powers, avoiding commitments and shying away from conflict.” 6 The Congress of
4

Schulze, 51.

5

Schulze, 53.

Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600-1947 (Harvard: Belknap Press,
2006), 510.
6
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Vienna came to be based on the belief, the more it fell under the influence of Klemens von
Metternich (1773-1859), that the wave of nationalism that ultimately defeated Napoleon could
one day drown the rulers of Europe as well. Those militaristic youth groups can one day march
against their monarchs. Thus, the hopes of a united German Empire were for now silenced, and
the monarchs tried to put Europe back together. “[The congress] now conferring in Vienna about
how to restore Europe’s ancient order, how to talk away the young Germans’ dream of unity and
freedom of their Fatherland, and, in the eyes of many, how to betray it.” 7 Congress’ betrayal of
the German dream was the signal for nationalists and liberals that the torch of freedom was their
responsibility and a united Germany was their prize, a prize that was prohibited by the
conservative monarchs of Europe.
Romantics and liberals took on the significant burden of trying to achieve a united
Germany. In many ways, they would prove impractical and unrealistic. “All sorts of
heterogeneous ideologies, interests and classes came together under the banner of the Nation,
and consequently the German nationalist movement as a whole was quite incapable of coming to
a clear-cut revolutionary decision-one reason why the revolution of 1848 failed.” 8 In 1848, there
was an unlimited number of plans for a united Germany. The revolutionists and romantics of
1848 proved themselves unrealistic as they were not united in their cause and were unable to
match the monarch’s military power. However, with this significant failure, the revolutionary
fervor of 1848 brought change. Politicians finally had a voice in the government as they formed
parliaments and houses of representatives such as the Landtag of Prussia. It also became
apparent that a united Germany became inevitable; it was only a question of who would control

7
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the forces in Germany and lead it to unification. The one who would take on this great task
would have to appeal to German militarism and liberalism.
Bismarck, the new Minister-President of Prussia, had an aristocratic and conservative
military background, but most importantly understood that he must work with liberals to reach a
united Germany under Prussia.
His ultimate objective was to annex the duchies to Prussia. The Prussian Chief of Staff
Helmut von Moltke may well have been the key influence here. Moltke was strongly
opposed to the transformation of the duchies into an independent principality, on the
grounds that the new entity might become a satellite of the Habsburgs and open up a hole
in Prussia’s northern seaward flank. 9
As the military aristocracy shared Bismarck’s view, he needed a war that would unite Germany
under the Prussian banner. He also needed to raise militarism, to motivate the German people to
join him on this great mission. In 1866, as the Prussian Kingdom withdrew from the German
Confederation, both sides prepared for war. Under Bismarck, the Prussian army was able to
resoundingly defeat the Austrian armies and those of its sister states in the confederation. “The
victory of the Prussian armies cannot, of course, be ascribed solely to the needle-gun. Although it
is difficult to gauge exactly the impact of such factors, there is evidence that the Austrians
suffered from lower morale by comparison with their Prussian adversaries.” 10 The victory was
not only due to Prussia’s superior military technology; it was also due to Prussia's militarism,
which inherently ensured high morale for its armies.
The victory over Austria brought significant change to the German Nation militarily and
politically.
The news of Prussia’s mobilization and victory transformed the situation utterly. The
Prussian occupation of Hanover, Dresden and Kasselb was greeted with a wave of
9

Clark, Iron Kingdom, 526.
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jubilation. Cheering crowds mobbed Bismarck whenever he appeared in
public…Bismarck had foreseen this: “At the moment of decision,’ he told Count von der
Goltz, the Prussian ambassador in Paris, ‘the masses will stand by the monarchy.” 11
Bismarck’s victory over Austria was the spark that lit the spirit of nationalism and militarism
back in the hearts of Prussian and German citizens. Austria was seen as the ancient ruler who
was satisfied with keeping his people weak as long as they cannot disobey his commands. In
addition, Austria’s diverse court did not in the slightest foster any feeling of German nationalism.
In contrast, the homogeneous Prussian court was much fertile for the idea of a united Germany.
Under the banner of the Prussian monarchy, all the forces of Germany united for the Crusade
under the command of Bismarck.
The formation of the North German Confederation in 1867 was one step closer to the
united German Empire. In reference to the First Crusade, the crusaders were now at Antioch and
only had to march through the Levant to reach their goal. In terms of the German Wars of
Unification, the unification seemed more achievable than ever before. However, the biggest
opponent to this unification was France. Even before the French Revolution, it was French policy
that a weak and disunited Germany was essential to French defense and the security of its eastern
borders. French Foreign Minister Charles Gravier Count Vergennes (1719-1787) wrote in 1779,
“what advantage [Germany] would have over us if this formidable power were limited by the
form of its constitution...We thus owe our superiority and our security to the forces of [German]
disunity.” 12 It was thus essential that France be defeated.
Two factors were essential to Bismarck to be able to defeat France and have the
legitimacy to do so. The first was that all of the German states, namely the ones in the Southern

11

Clark, 543.
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Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of German Unification, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 310.
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German States, would be willing to enter a total war under Prussia's leadership. Again, the spirit
of Prussian militarism would play a significant role. In the new army of the united North German
Confederation,
[S]enior officers were appointed by the King of Prussia and swore allegiance to him. Its
soldiers as well swore oaths of obedience. Prussian military law and Prussian drill
regulations were adopted for the whole army. Formations might bear local titles or
honorific designations but were numbered sequentially—with the “old Prussian”
regiments taking pride of place. 13
Prussian militarism expanded its influence into all forces of the North German Confederation.
The united German army would enjoy the morale, pride, and the military spirit of Prussia. The
second major factor to the legitimacy of the German Empire would require that France declares
war on Germany; this would aid the narrative that France always conspired to keep Germany
weak and always worked against German interest. France’s aggression would also ensure
Austrian neutrality in case of a war with France.
When France declared war on the North German Confederation in 1870, all of Germany's
forces stood behind Prussia. Even the reluctant King of Bavaria, Ludwig II (1845-1886), who
had maintained a friendly relationship with Napoleon III (1808-1873), was forced to ally with
Prussia and join the war against France. The German Crusade was finally within the grasp of its
goal of a united Germany. The total German victory over France in its forms of Empire and then
Republic was a testament to Bismarck and Helmuth von Moltke's (1800-1891) success and the
superiority of the Prussian military. The proclamation of the German Empire on 18 January 1871
was so iconic, as victorious Germans proclaimed their unity and crowned their new leader in the
headquarters of their most vicious enemy. It was as if the crusaders finally proclaimed their
victory in Jerusalem. The Prussian military also had its place in the sun. The glorious parade it

13

Showalter, 202.
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had in Paris after a furious siege, ensured a sense of glory and superiority into Prussian soldiers;
it also ensured lasting military spirit in the hearts of citizens of the German Empire.
‘Militarism’ became one of the foremost ‘semantic rallying points’ in modern German
political culture.' In whatever sense it was used, it drew attention to the structural
connections between the military and the wider social and political system in which it
was embedded. The army was without a doubt one of the central institutions of Prussian
life after 1871. 14
Militarism was so effective in the unification of Germany that it would play a major role in
German society. Many aristocratic families would be honoured to have their sons serve in the
Prussian military. Even with the German defeat in World War One, the Prussian military was
still a proud one, retaining much of the glory it gained in the grand conquests of the Wars of
Unification. Prussian military figures like Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934), who became
President of the Republic in 1925, played a significant role in German society and politics. Thus,
the victorious allies in 1945 concluded that the only way to stop Prussian militarism was to
destroy the state of Prussia, which ceased to exist in 1947.
The Wars of German Unification were a significant contributor in Prussia’s sense of
superiority and glory. These wars, which are a series of episodes in a crusade for German
sovereignty and unification, fostered Prussian militarism into its subjects even though they might
not have fired a bullet for Germany’s glory. In a sense, everyone was a part of the Crusade by
merely being German. The Prussian victory in the Wars of Unification was so great that Prussian
pride was not totally destroyed even by a defeat as severe as the First World War. Only after the
ultimate and crushing defeat in the Second World War, that Prussian militarism lost its
superiority. A total defeat was the only way Prussian militarism would finally lose its great pride,
which it got from its leading role in the Crusade for German unification.

14
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